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The learned predictiveness (LP) procedure has been interpreted as useful to discuss the 
mechanisms that regulate a form of attention related to the limited learning resources of the 
organisms. In this procedure, in Stage 1, half of the cues are established as accurate predictors 
of their outcomes, and the other half are established as poorer predictors. In Stage 2, all cues 
are equally predictive of a new outcome. On test, participants rate the likelihood that the cues 
would produce Stage 2 outcomes. It has been consistently found that participants rate the 
accurate predictors higher than poorer predictors. This pattern of results has been interpreted as 
supporting the notion that stimulus associability is directly related to predictive accuracy. We 
report an experiment investigating this LP effect in which we manipulated the maximum time 
to respond on each trial: 20 s vs. 4 s. Participants in the long-time period condition showed both 
a clear discrimination in Stage 1 and a LP effect on the test. Participants in the short-time period 
condition, however, showed a clear discrimination in Stage 1, but did not show the LP effect 
on the test. This suggests that the mechanism involved in the LP effect requires more time than 
the automatic associative mechanisms involved in discrimination learning. These results 
therefore invite to reconsider the importance of the LP effect in discussing the mechanisms 
regulating stimulus associability. 
 

















Associative learning allows human and nonhuman animals to encode the relationship 
between environmental stimuli and their consequences. Possession and use of such information 
bestows advantages. Priority processing of stimuli that are good predictors of important 
consequences allows the efficient generation of suitable ways of responding to the predicted 
events. However, the attentional mechanisms responsible for this preparatory and response-
generating function appear to coexist with other selective mechanisms that serve to optimize 
our learning resources. In particular, there is a need to learn about only stimuli that have 
unknown or uncertain consequences. Once the outcome of a stimulus has been fully established 
(in associative terms, once associative strength has reached an asymptote) it no longer needs to 
command attention, at least as far as further learning is concerned. This notion formed the basis 
of the theory proposed by Pearce and Hall (1980) which describes how the associability of a 
stimulus is determined. According to this theory, a stimulus with uncertain consequences (for 
example, a novel stimulus) has a high associability, (commands the resources necessary for 
learning) and is learned about readily. As a result, uncertainty about the outcome of the stimulus 
is reduced and, with it, stimulus associability (i.e., the rate to which the stimulus is learned 
about). Pearce and Hall adopted the terms used by Shiffrin and Schneider (1977), suggesting 
that initially a stimulus undergoes controlled processing but that, as its consequences become 
known, processing shifts to an automatic mode.  Automatic processing is enough to ensure 
exploitation of the predictive information supplied by the stimulus but does not allow further 
learning about the stimulus. 
The notion that the associability of a stimulus declines as it comes to predict its 
consequences has received substantial support from experiments using conditioning procedures 
with nonhuman animals as the subjects (e.g., Hall & Pearce, 1979, 1982; Pearce, Kaye, & Hall, 
1982). But, as Le Pelley, Mitchell, Beesley, George, and Wills (2016) have pointed out, there 
is scant evidence for this proposal from studies of associative learning in humans (e.g., see 
Griffiths, Johnson, & Mitchell, 2011). Indeed, one procedure that has been widely used for the 
study of transfer effects in human learning, the learned predictiveness procedure, developed by 
Le Pelley and McLaren (2003; see also Lochmann & Wills, 2003, and Le Pelley et al., 2016, 
for an extensive review), has yielded quite contrary results to the notion of associability 
proposed by Pearce and Hall (1980). Next, this procedure is explained in more detail. 
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Although some of the studies that have exploited this procedure have used different cover 
histories, a similar general design has always been employed (see Table 1). In this general 
design, the letters represent cues (e.g., different food meals) and the numbers represent the 
outcomes than can occur after the presentation of the cues (e.g, the allergies that can suffer a 
fictitious patient after eating the food meals). So, for example, AW->1 indicates a sort of trial 
in which the cues A and W, are simultaneously presented, and followed by the occurrence of 
the outcome 1. The cues are presented in pairs across all the experiment. Participants receive 
first a sort of training in which one of two outcomes (1 or 2) can occur in each trial, and while 
one cue of each pair is consistently paired with an outcome (A and D are consistently paired 
with 1, and B and C are consistently paired with 2), the other cue is equally paired with both 1 
and 2. So, participants are exposed to conditions in which they can learn that there are 
differences in the predictive accuracy of the cues (hence, we can refer to this sort of training as 
differential training). 
 Once that the initial training is finished, the background history presents a similar 
subsequent task, but mixing the same cues in different pairs and also substituting the occurrence 
of the outcomes 1 and 2 by two other different outcomes, 3 and 4. For example, in the study by 
Le Pelley and McLaren (2003), participants were told that they were attending different patients 
that suffered different sorts of allergic reactions (Mr. X in the first stage, and Mr. Y in the 
second stage). During this second stage of training, each pair of cues is formed by a previously-
accurate predictor and a previously-inaccurate predictor.  But, critically, in this stage the two 
cues of each pair are equally paired with the corresponding novel outcome (hence, we can refer 
to this sort of training as non-differential training).  
The question of interest is whether the differences in predictive accuracy established during 
the initial differential training will influence the rate of learning about the cues in the non-
differential training. This is assessed in a final test in which the same cues are again mixed in 
four different novel pairs, in such a way that two pairs are formed by cues paired with outcome 
3 (AC and VX), and the two other pairs are formed by cues paired with outcome 4 (BD and 
WY). Two of these pairs (AC and BD) are formed by cues that were accurate predictors during 
the initial differential training, and the other two pairs (VX and WY) are formed by inaccurate 
predictors in that stage. It has been routinely found that in this final test, participants rate more 
likely the occurrence of the correct outcome in the presence of the pairs formed by the cues that 
were accurate predictors during the initial differential training (e.g., Le Pelley & McLaren, 
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2003; Lochmann & Wills, 2003; Rodríguez & Hall, 2019; Experiment 1). Le Pelley and 
McLaren (2003) interpreted this effect as indicating that the learning-rate (i.e., the associabilty) 
of the predictive cues had been enhanced by the first stage of training. An interpretation that is 
directly contrary to the account of associability change offered by the Pearce-Hall (1980) 
model, but supports an alternative view of stimulus associability in terms of the theory proposed 
by Mackintosh (1975), according to which the predictive accuracy is directly related to 
associability.  
The existence of these two sorts of results (some giving support to Pearce and Hall and 
some others supporting the contrary notion proposed by Mackintosh) has encouraged 
theoretical attempts in order to integrate these two views of associability. These hybrid models 
conceive the Pearce-Hall’s and Mackintosh’s associability factors as interactive elements of a 
more complex attentional mechanism able to regulate the learning-rate (e.g., Esber & 
Haselgrove, 2010; Hall & Rodríguez, 2010; Le Pelley, 2004; Pearce & Mackintosh, 2010). 
However, it is possible that these theoretical steps have been made before to confirm that all 
the discussed results actually reflect associability effects. This could be the case of the learned 
predictiveness effect. In a recent study, Rodríguez and Hall (2020; Experiment 2) provided a 
demonstration of the learned predictiveness effect using a modified procedure (see Table 1) that 
precluded the explanation in terms of the account offered by Le Pelley and McLaren (2003) 
based on the notion of associability derived from Mackintosh (1975).  
Standard learned predictiveness procedure  
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Table 1. Each letter represents a cue (a foodstuff) and numbers represent outcomes (Os: allergic reactions). 
The procedure used in this experiment (Rodríguez and Hall, 2020; Experiment 2) was 
essentially the same as that used by Le Pelley and McLaren (2003), except that the order of the 
training phases was reversed, with differential training being followed by non-differential 
training. With this arrangement, any difference in associability between accurate and inaccurate 
predictors produced by differential training with Outcomes 1 and 2 would be irrelevant given 
that learning about the relationship between the cues and Outcomes 3 and 4 had already 
occurred. The critical test was that given after differential training (“retest” in Table 1) in which 
it was observed, as in the case of the standard learned predictiveness effect, superior 
performance with AC and BD than with VX and WY.  
This pattern of results shows that the learned predictiveness effect survives a manipulation 
in which the order of the differential and non-differential training phases is reversed. To the 
light of these results, Rodríguez and Hall (2020) concluded that learned predictiveness can be 
obtained when effects depending on changes in associability (of the sort envisaged by the theory 
of Mackintosh, 1975) cannot be responsible. However, these results do not directly falsify that, 
under the standard conditions, the effect is mediated by associability changes. The goal of the 
present study was to get more direct evidence against this notion.  
Experiment 
A relevant feature of the learned predictiveness effect is that, as in many other human 
learning procedures, the researcher does not estimate the strength of the target associations 
registering their assumed effects on the magnitude of an automatic and involuntary response. 
Instead, participants are asked to judge how likely is the occurrence of some given events, and 
they are often given a relatively long time to emit these judgments.  Taking into account this 
feature of the procedure, Mitchel et al. (2012) have argued that the learned predictiveness effect 
might not be determined by an automatic, bottom-up, attentional mechanism of the sort 
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described previously for associability changes, but rather that it might be the consequence of 
an “inference based controlled attentional process.”  When the participants are faced with new 
outcomes in the non-differential phase of a learned predictiveness study (i.e., the second stage), 
they infer that the cues that were predictive in the prior differential training are likely to be 
predictive in the second.  
The hypothesis that we want to test in this experiment is derived from this notion. If the 
learned predictiveness effect depends on a top-down inferential mechanism, rather than a 
bottom-up automatic associability mechanism, it should not survive to a severe limitation of 
the time available to respond on test. Given the cognitive load of the task, the inferential process 
alluded by Mitchel et. al (2012) may not be enough to produce the expected effect. Participants 
will need to keep on doing this process of inference during the test and this will take some time.  
In order to test this notion, we designed an experiment with two groups (see Table 1). One 
of these groups, Group20, received an almost identical procedure to that used in the study by 
Rodríguez and Hall (2020; Experiment 1) in their demonstration of the standard learned 
predictiveness effect. In this group, the participants were given 20 seconds on each trial of the 
two different test stages. Participants from Group4 received an identical training to that received 
by Group20, except that their participants were given just 4 seconds to respond on each test 
trial. This limitation of time might be conflicting with the test procedure usually employed in 
previous studies. On these studies, participants were required to give a numerical score (from 
zero to 10) to each of the two possible outcomes. In the present experiment, we attempted to 
make simpler the test responding in order to avoid non-interesting explanations to any 
precluding effect obtained on Group 4 (e.g., participants in this group did not show a good 
performance because they had not enough time to finish their rating). Accordingly, on the test 
trials of the present experiment, all the participants were required just to choose what allergy, 
between the two possible outcomes, was going to happen.  
If the learned predictiveness effect is not due to any mechanism related to changes in 
stimulus associability, we expected to observe the effect in Group20 but not in Group4. If, on 
the contrary, the learned predictiveness effect is caused by stimulus associability, we expected 






Sixty-eight students (48 female; Mage= 21.12 in a range from 18 to 34) from the 
University of the Basque Country who, after being informed, agreed to participate in an 
experiment that involved cognitive tasks. All of the students had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. The Research Ethics Committee of the University of the Basque Country (CEISH) 
approved the experimental protocol. 
 
Apparatus and stimuli 
The participants were tested individually, sitting at approximately 50cm from the 17-in 
screen of a standard PC. The eight cues, A to D for predictors and W to Z for non-predictors, 
were images of fruits (apple, orange, melon, grapes, banana, strawberry, pear and cherry) and 
were presented on a white background. 
 
The assignment of the images to a specific cue was randomized for each participant. 
The outcomes were pictures of the aversive reactions presented on the same background and 
accompanied by a text specifying the name of the reaction in Spanish underneath. The outcomes 
in the first stage (non-differential training) were ‘’headache’’ and ‘’conjunctivitis’’ and in the 
second one, ‘’stomach ache’’ and ‘’rash’’. The assignment of these negative reactions to 
Outcomes 1 or 2, and outcomes 3 or 4 was also randomized. 
 
Procedure 
Subjects were informed that they would play the role of an allergist who had to learn to 
predict the negative reactions that a patient, Mr. X, would suffer after having ingested certain 
pairs of fruits. 
Differential training. This stage comprised 14 blocks of trials, with each of the eight 
trial types shown in Table 1 occurring once per block. Each trial began with the simultaneous 
presentation of the pictures of two cues (arranged horizontally at the center of the screen, 3 cm 
apart) and a question (arranged horizontally at the center of the screen, 3 cm underneath the 
pictures of the cues): Stomachache or rash? (for participants for whom stomachache was 
Outcome 1), or Rash or stomachache? (for participants for whom rash was Outcome 1). After 
6 s, a picture illustrating the appropriate reaction, along with the name of that reaction, was 
presented for 3 s. In each block, the trial order was randomized apart from the restriction that 
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the same pair of cues could not occur on consecutive trials (i.e., it was not permitted for the 
same pair of fruits to be presented on the last trial of a block and the first trial of the next block). 
For each trial type the position (left/ right) of the fruits on the screen was counterbalanced across 
blocks, and the order in which these positions varied was randomized across the experiment.  
Test of differential training. Following the initial stage of training, participants were told 
that they would be tested on what they had learned. The test consisted of eight trials, one for 
each type of trial of Stage 1 (see Table 1). Each trial consisted of a pair of fruits. The left/right 
position of each fruit and the order of presentation of each type of trial were randomized across 
participants. Participants were informed that Mr. X would again eat pairs of fruits and that they 
should rate, for each pair, what outcome, Outcome 1 or 2, would occur subsequently. Responses 
were made on paper sheets showing the name of the two outcomes for each trial. Participants 
were asked to draw a cross on the name of the outcome that they thought that was to happen. 
Participants from Group20 were allowed 20 s to make their response, and participants from 
Group4 were given just 4 s. No feedback was provided in this test. 
Non-differential training. Immediately after differential training test, participants were 
told that they were now to deal with a different patient, Mr. Y, who suffered different reactions 
to the same cues. There were four blocks in this stage in each of which the four non-differential 
trial types shown in Table 1 appeared once per block in random order. The structure of trials in 
this stage of training was identical to that of trials in the previous differential training stage. 
Test of non-differential training. Following the second stage of training, participants 
received instructions for a new test. This consisted of four trials with new combinations of cues, 
AC and BD being composed of cues that had been predictive in the first stage of differential 
training, VX and WY composed of cues that had been poor predictors in that first stage (see 
Table 1). As in the previous test stage, responses were made on paper sheets showing the name 
of the two outcomes for each trial (in this case Outcome 3 or 4). Participants were asked to 
draw a cross on the name of the outcome that they thought that was to happen. Again, 
participants from Group20 were allowed 20 s to make their response, and participants from 





Data treatment and analysis.  
For the differential training test, percentages of right answers were calculated for each 
group (Group 20/Group4). Participants that over the total of eight trials of this test failed on 
four or more trials (i.e., marked the occurrence of the incorrect outcome) were excluded from 
the analysis, on the grounds that they had failed to learn the contingencies in effect during 
differential training. For the non-differential training test, percentages of right answers were 
calculated for each cue condition (Accurate vs. Innacurate) and group (Group 20 vs. Group4). 
Data were analyzed by the analysis of variance (ANOVA) and a criterion of statistical 
significance of p less than .05 was adopted. Effect sizes for ANOVAs are reported as partial eta 
squared and those for pairwise comparisons are reported using Cohen’s d. The 95% confidence 
intervals (CIs) around the effect sizes are also reported in parentheses following the effect size. 
4. Results 
Figure 1 shows the percentage of correct answers of the groups 20 and 4 across the eight 
trials of the test after the differential training. Both groups showed a good performance. As it 
can be seen, shortening the time available to respond did not preclude the manifestation of a 
good discrimination in Group4. A series of analysis of variance (ANOVA) performed with 










Figure 1. Percentage of correct answers given in the differential training test by Group4 (white boxes) 
and Group 20 (gray boxes). 
 
Figure 2 shows the mean percentage of correct answers showed by Groups 20 and 4 to 
accurate and inaccurate cues, on the test stage after the non-differential training. Group 20 
exhibited a pattern of results indicating a learned predictiveness effect: participants from this 
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groups showed better performance to the accurate than to the inaccurate cues. This pattern was 
not observed, however, in Group 4. Participants from this group showed a, non-specially high, 
similar level of performance to both accurate and inaccurate cues. The overall pattern of results 
indicates that a shortening of the time available to respond on test precludes the arising of a 
learned predictiveness effect. Statistical analysis confirmed this description of the data. A 
mixed 2 (Group: G20 vs. G4) x 2 (Cue: Accurate vs. Inaccurate) ANOVA revealed a non-
significant effect of group, F<1, a significant main effect of cue, F(1, 62) = 6.33,  p = 0.014, 
and a significant interaction group x cue, F(1, 62) = 10.1,  p = 0.0024. Further analyses 
performed in order to clarify the source of this interaction revealed that there was an effect of 
cue in G20, t(33) = 3.2, p = 0.0031, but not in G4, t(30) < 1, and that there were not differences 
between groups either in their performance to the accurate cues, t(31) = 1.24, p = 0.21, neither 








Figure 2. Percentage of correct answers given to accurate and inaccurate cues, by Group4 and Group 20, 
in the non-differential training test  
5. Discussion 
The experiment reported here was designed in order to test the hypothesis that the learned 
predictiveness effect is mediated by other mechanisms different to changes in associability. We 
found that a shortening in the time (from 20 to 4 seconds) available for test responding 
precluded the appearance of the effect. It could be argued that the absence of the effect in Group 
4 might be reflecting that the limitation of time in this group impeded to express the respond of 
the participants. However, this account is not supported by the fact that such a short time was 
enough for the participants to show a very good performance (so good as that showed by 
participants in group 20). The pattern of results is therefore better explained in the terms of our 
hypothesis: the learned predictiveness effect seems to be due to the expression of an inference 
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process from all the knowledge that the participants have learned during the task. For this 
inference to be processed and expressed successfully, it seems necessary to dispose of a 
relatively long time during the test trials. If learned predictiveness were the result of the 
operation of bottom-up, automatic, attentional processes, a reduction in the time available for 
responding might have even enhance the size of the effect. 
 
    These results thus come to add to previous evidence (e.g., Hall & Rodríguez, 2010; Rodríguez 
& Hall, 2019) indicating that the learned predictiveness effect might not be reflecting the 
operation of attentional mechanisms related to optimize the limited learning resources of the 
organisms. In other words, although the logic of the design is open to interpretations of its 
results in terms of effects on associability, it seems that actually it does not capture the essence 
of other similar designs applied in the non-human literature (e.g., Hall & Pearce, 1979). It seems 
convenient that the hybrid models mentioned in the Introduction of this work, will reconsider 
the (perhaps scarce) importance of the learned predictiveness effect for their proposals about 
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